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Abstract: Composite indicators (or indexes) are very common in economic and 
business statistics for benchmarking the mutual and relative progress of countries in a 
variety of policy domains such as industrial competitiveness, sustainable 
development, globalisation and innovation. The proliferation of the production of 
composite indicators by all the major international organizations is a clear symptom 
of their political importance and operational relevance in policy-making. As a 
consequence, improvements in the way these indicators are constructed and used 
seem to be a very important research issue from both the theoretical and operational 
points of view. This paper starts with an analysis of the axiomatic system underlying 
the mathematical modelling commonly used to construct composite indicators. Then 
a different methodological framework, based on non-compensatory/non-linear 
aggregation rules, is developed. Main features of the proposed approach are: (i) the 
axiomatic system is made completely explicit, and (ii) the sources of technical 
uncertainty and imprecise assessment are reduced to the minimum possible degree. 
 
Keywords: Index Numbers and Aggregation, Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis, 
Social Choice, Environmental Sustainability Index 
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1. Introduction 
Composite indicators are very common in fields such as economic and business 
statistics (e.g., the OECD Composite of Leading Indicators) and are used in a 
variety of policy domains such as industrial competitiveness, sustainable 
development, quality of life assessment, globalisation, innovation or academic 
performance (see Cox and others 1992, Cribari-Neto et al 1999, Färe et al. 1994, 
Griliches 1990, Forni et al. 2001, Huggins 2003, Grupp and Mogee 2004, Lovell 
et al. 1995, Author 2005, Author et al. 2005, Saisana and Tarantola 2002, and 
Wilson and Jones 2002, among others). The proliferation of these indicators is a 
clear symptom of their importance in policy-making, and operational relevance in 
economic statistics in general (see e.g. Granger, 2001). All the major international 
organizations such as OECD, the EU, the World Economic Forum or the IMF are 
producing composite indicators in a wide variety of fields (Author et al., 2005). A 
general objective of most of these indicators is the ranking of countries and their 
benchmarking according to some aggregated dimensions (see e.g. Cherchye, 
2001, Kleinknecht 2002 and OECD, 2003) (Table 4 in the appendix supplies a 
sample of various types of composite indicators).  
A recent report by OECD clearly states that “… Composite indicators are 
valued for their ability to integrate large amounts of information into easily 
understood formats for a general audience. However, composite indicators can be 
misleading, particularly when they are used to rank country performance on 
complex economic phenomena and even more so when country rankings are 
compared over time. They have many methodological difficulties which must be 
confronted and can be easily manipulated to produce desired outcomes… The 
proliferation of composite indicators in various policy domains raises questions 
regarding their accuracy and reliability. Given the seemingly ad hoc nature of 
their computation, the sensitivity of the results to different weighting and 
aggregation techniques, and continuing problems of missing data, composite 
indicators can result in distorted findings on country performance and incorrect 
policy prescriptions… Despite their many deficiencies, composite indicators will 
continue to be developed due to their usefulness as a communication tool and, on 
occasion, for analytical purposes” (OECD, 2003, p. 3).   
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As a consequence, the improvement of the way these indicators are constructed 
and used seems to be a very important research issue from both theoretical and 
operational points of view. Our main objective in this article is to contribute to the 
improvement of the overall quality of sustainability composite indicators (or 
indexes) by looking at one of their technical weaknesses, that is, the aggregation 
convention used for their construction. For this aim, we first try to clarify the 
axiomatic system of a linear aggregation rule. Then we check if this is compatible 
with the objective of a composite indicator using some results of multi-attribute 
utility theory and measurement theory literature. Finally, starting from concepts 
coming from multi-criteria decision theory and social choice, a non-compensatory 
aggregation rule is proposed and is corroborated with numerical examples.  
2. On the Use of Linear Aggregation Rules 
 Although various functional forms for the underlying aggregation rules of a 
composite indicator have been developed in the literature (e.g. Diewert, 1976, 
Journal of Economic and Social Measurement, 2002), in the standard practice, a 
composite indicator I, can be considered a weighted linear aggregation rule 
applied to a set of variables (OECD, 2003, p. 5):  
1
N
i i
i
I w x
=
= , where ix is a scale adjusted variable (e.g. GDP per capita)
normalized between zero and one, and iw a weight attached to ix , usually with 
1
1
N
i
i
w
=
= and 0 1iw  , 1, 2,..., .i N=
The main research question to be answered is the following: under which 
axiomatic conditions a linear aggregation rule can be used?  
 A first answer to this question is given by the following theorem (Debreu, 
1960; Keeney and Raiffa, 1976; Krantz et al., 1971): given the variables  x1, x2,..., 
xn, an additive aggregation function exists if and only if these variables are 
mutually preferentially independent. A subset of indicators Y is preferentially 
independent of Yc=Q (the complement of Y) only if any conditional preference 
among elements of Y, holding all elements of Q fixed, remain the same, regardless 
of the levels at which Q are held. The variables x1, x2,..., xn are mutually 
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preferentially independent if every subset Y of these variables is preferentially 
independent of its complementary set of evaluators. 
 Preferential independence is a very strong condition from both the 
epistemological and operational points of view, it implies that the trade-off ratio 
between two variables ,x yS is independent of the values of the n-2 other variables, 
i.e.  
 
, 0x ySq
 =
, ,x y Y q Q    (Ting, 1971).                                                      (1) 
 
From an operational point of view this means that an additive aggregation 
function permits the assessment of the marginal contribution of each variable 
separately (as a consequence of the preferential independence condition). The 
marginal contribution of each variable can then be added together to yield a total 
value. If, for example, environmental dimensions are involved, the use of a linear 
aggregation procedure then implies that among the different aspects of an 
ecosystem there are not phenomena of synergy or conflict. This appears to be 
quite an unrealistic assumption (Funtowicz et al., 1990). For example, "laboratory 
experiments made clear that the combined impact of the acidifying substances 
SO2, NOX, NH3 and O3 on plant growth is substantially more severe that the 
(linear) addition of the impacts of each of these substances alone would be.” 
(Dietz and van der Straaten, 1992).1 What happens if the linear aggregation is 
nevertheless done? The resulting indicator will be biased, i.e. it will not entirely 
and truthfully reflect the information of its components. The dimension and the 
direction of the error are not easily determined, thus the correction of the 
composite cannot be properly done. Summarising, we can conclude that the 
assumption of preference independence is essential for the existence of a linear 
 
1 From an epistemological point of view, preferential independence implies the separability of 
values. This is quite an important issue in philosophy; for example, in ethics the thesis of the unity 
of the virtues is defended to different degrees by Plato, Aristotle and Aquinas. "... it is true that a 
virtue often cannot be treated apart from the company it keeps. Courage is not an excellence when 
it appears amid vices-for example as a disposition of the dedicated Nazi.... For example, one's 
appreciation of the value of freedom, "positive" or "negative", in a particular society, cannot be 
simply treated as separable from what individuals realise with that freedom. Different political 
and ethical values when applied in a particular context cannot be applied in isolation from one 
another” (O'Neill, 1993, p. 114).  
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aggregation rule. Unfortunately, it is usually never tested whether preference 
independence applies to a given composite indicator, although this assumption 
has very strong consequences which often are not desirable in an index2. When 
preference independence cannot be advocated, non-linear aggregation rules are 
then needed.
Another issue connected with the use of a linear aggregation rule is the one of 
weights. The common practice in attaching weights is well synthesised by a 
recent OECD document: “Greater weight should be given to components which 
are considered to be more significant in the context of the particular composite 
indicator” (OECD, 2003, p. 10). In the decision theory literature, this concept of 
weights is usually referred to as symmetrical importance, that is "… if we have 
two non-equal numbers to construct a vector in R2, then it is preferable to place 
the greatest number in the position corresponding to the most important 
criterion." (Podinovskii, 1994, p. 241). 
 Author (2006) illustrate that the concept of symmetrical importance is 
incompatible with a linear aggregation rule, given that in a linear aggregation rule, 
weights can only have the meaning of a trade-off ratio. As a consequence, since 
trade-offs always depend on the scales of measurement used, and since weights 
are connected to the values of trade-offs, weights also depend on the scales of 
measurement. As clearly shown by Anderson and Zalinski (1988), when weights 
depend on the range of variable scores, such as in the context of a linear 
aggregation rule, the interpretation of weights as a measurement of the 
(psychological) concept of importance is completely inappropriate. Summarizing 
the discussion we can state that the use of weights in combination with intensity of 
preference (given that variables are always supposed to be measured on an 
interval or ratio scale) within a linear aggregation rule originates compensatory 
aggregation conventions and gives the meaning of trade-offs to the weights3.
2 Often in practice the test of mutual preferential independence is not done because it is considered 
extremely time consuming. For M variables, there are M(M-1)/2 pairs that must be independent, 
thus the number of conditions to verify gets astronomically large as M gets even modestly large. 
However some results due to Leontieff (1947) can save much of the potential work to be done (see 
also Keeney and Raiffa, 1976, p. 112-114). 
3 There is unanimous agreement in the literature that the only method where weights are computed 
as scaling constants and there is no ambiguous interpretation is the so-called trade-off method 
starting with revealed preferences. No weight importance judgment is required in this method. The 
trade-off method can be briefly described as follows. Let’s consider two countries A and B,
differing only for the scores of variables xk and xt. The problem is then to adjust the score of say xk
for B, in such a way that A and B become indifferent. Formally, it is:  
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In standard composite indicators, compensability among the different 
individual indicators is always assumed; this implies complete substitutability 
among the various components considered. For example, in a hypothetical 
sustainability index, economic growth can always substitute any environmental 
destruction or inside e.g., the environmental dimension, clean air can compensate 
for a loss of potable water. From a descriptive point of view, such a complete 
compensability is often not desirable. 
 Vansnick (1990) showed that the two main approaches in multi-criteria 
aggregation procedures i.e., the compensatory and non-compensatory ones can be 
directly derived from the seminal work of Borda and Condorcet. If one wants the 
weights to be interpreted as “importance coefficients” (or equivalently 
symmetrical importance of variables) non-compensatory aggregation procedures 
must be used (Bouyssou, 1986; Bouyssou and Vansnick, 1986). From a social 
choice point of view, these non-compensatory rules are always Condorcet 
consistent rules (Author, 2006a); their use in the framework of composite 
indicators, can be corroborated by referring to a clear result of social choice 
literature4. The majority rule is theoretically the most desirable aggregation rule, 
but practically often produces undesirable intransitivities, thus “more limited 
ambitions are compulsory. The next highest ambition for an aggregation 
algorithm is to be Condorcet” (Arrow and Raynaud, 1986, p. 77).  
 Thus we can conclude that the use of non-compensatory aggregation rules to 
construct composite indicators is compulsory for reasons of theoretical 
consistency when weights with the meaning of importance coefficients are used 
or when the assumption of preferential independence does not hold. Moreover the 
 
' ' '' ''
1 1( ) ( ) ( ,..., ,..., ,..., ) ( ,..., ,..., ,..., )k t n k t nI A I B I x x x x I x x x x=  = 
' ' '' ''
1 1
, ,
N N
i i k k t t i i k k t t
i i
i k t i k t
w x w x w x w x w x w x
= =	 	
 + + = + +    ' ' '' ''k k t t k k t tw x w x w x w x + = +  
This last equation is an equation in the unknown wk and wt. To compute the N weights as trade-
offs, it is necessary to assess N-1 equivalence relations which together with the usual 
normalization constraint   
wi+ … + wn=1 determine a linear system of N equations in the N unknown weights. Of course if 
some uncertainty on the variable scores exists, this method cannot be applied. As one can easily 
understand to assess weights as trade-offs, as it should be always done when using a linear 
aggregation rule, it is a much harder job than to use weights as importance coefficients. 
4 Ebert and Welsch (2004) also propose the use social choice to improve the theoretical framework 
of environmental indexes. 
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use of Condorcet consistent rules is also desirable in general as advised by social 
choice literature. Finally, one should note that to use a linear aggregation rule, the 
assumption that the variable scores are measured on an interval or ratio scale of 
measurement and no uncertainty exists must always apply. Rarely this happens in 
the practice of composite indicators, where for instance, sometimes quantitative 
scores are arbitrarily given to variable scores originally measured on an ordinal 
measurement scale (see e.g. Nicoletti et al., 2000). On the contrary, by using 
Condorcet aggregation rules no limitation on the measurement scale of the 
variable scores exists (Author, 2006). 
 For all these reasons, we think that in some applications the use of non-
compensatory Condorcet consistent aggregation rules is desirable. Since this 
possibility has almost never been explored in the framework of composite 
indicators the following Section is devoted to this issue. 
3. An Axiomatic Approach for the Construction of Non-
Compensatory/Non-Linear Condorcet Consistent Composite 
Indicators 
 When various variables are used to evaluate two different countries, some of 
these variables may be in favour of country a while other variables may be in 
favour of country b. As a consequence a conflict among the variables exists. How 
this conflict can be treated at the light of a non-compensatory logic and taking 
into account the absence of preference independence? This is the classical multi-
criteria discrete problem (Author, 1995; Roy, 1996; Vincke, 1992). With this 
analogy in mind, we present an aggregation convention for (non-linear and non-
compensatory) composite indicators able to rank different countries. For sake of 
clearness, some basic definitions are first given. These definitions are adapted to 
the context of composite indicators borrowing concepts from multi-criteria 
decision theory and complex system theory5.
3.1 Basic definitions 
 
5 Some of these definitions were inspired by discussions with M. Giampietro. 
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Dimension: is the highest hierarchical level of analysis and indicates the scope of 
objectives, individual indicators and variables. For example, a sustainability 
composite indicator can include economic, social and environmental dimensions. 
Objective: an objective indicates the direction of change desired. For example, 
within the economic dimension GDP has to be maximised; within the social 
dimension social exclusion has to be minimised; within the environmental 
dimension CO2 emissions have to be minimised. 
Individual indicator: it is the basis for evaluation in relation to a given objective 
(any objective may imply a number of different individual indicators). It is a 
function that associates each single country with a variable indicating its 
desirability according to expected consequences related to the same objective.  
For example, GDP, saving rate and inflation rate inside the objective “growth 
maximisation”. 
Variable: is a constructed measure stemming from a process that represents, at a 
given point in space and time, a shared perception of a real-world state of affairs 
consistent with a given individual indicator. To give an example, in comparing 
two countries, inside the economic dimension, one objective can be 
“maximisation of economic growth”; the individual indicator might be R&D 
performance, the indicator score or variable can be “number of patents per million 
of inhabitants”.  Another example: an objective connected with the social 
dimension can be “maximisation of the residential attractiveness”. A possible 
individual indicator is then “residential density”. The variable providing the 
individual indicator score might be the ratio persons per hectare. 
A composite indicator or synthetic index is an aggregate of all dimensions, 
objectives, individual indicators and variables used. This implies that what 
formally defines a composite indicator is the set of properties underlying its 
aggregation convention. The rest of this section deals with this issue. 
 
3.2 Problem definition 
 Given a set of individual indicators G={gm}, m=1,2,..., M, and a finite set  
A={an}, n=1, 2,..., N of countries, let’s assume that the evaluation of each country 
an with respect to an individual indicator gm (i.e. the indicator score or variable) is 
based on an ordinal, interval or ratio scale of measurement. For simplicity of 
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exposition, we assume that a higher value of an individual indicator is preferred to 
a lower one (i.e. the higher, the better), that is: 
 


=
>
)()(
)()(
agagaIa
agagaPa
kmjmkj
kmjmkj (2) 
 
Where, P and I indicate a preference and an indifference relation respectively, 
both fulfilling the transitive property.  
 Let’s also assume the existence of a set of individual indicator weights 
W={wm}, m=1,2,...,M,  with   
=
=
M
m
mw
1
1 , derived as importance coefficients. The 
mathematical problem to be dealt with is then how to use this available 
information to rank in a complete pre-order (i.e. without any incomparability 
relation) all the countries from the best to the worst one. In doing so the following 
properties are desirable: 
1. The sources of uncertainty and imprecise assessment should be reduced as 
much as possible. 
2. The manipulation rules should be the more objective and as simple as 
possible, that is all ad hoc parameters should be avoided.  
3. A theoretical guarantee that weights are used with the meaning of 
“symmetrical importance” must exist. As a consequence, complete 
compensability should be avoided. This entails that variables have to be 
used with an ordinal meaning. This is not a problem since no loss of 
information is implied (Arrow and Raynaud, 1986). Moreover, given that 
often the measurement of variables is imprecise (see OECD, 2003, p.7), it 
seems even desirable to use indicator scores with an ordinal meaning. 
4. Desirable ranking procedures using ordinal information are always of a 
Condorcet type (Arrow and Raynaud, 1986, Moulin, 1988). A problem 
inherent to this family of algorithm is the presence of cycles, i.e. cases 
where aPb, bPc and cPa. This problem has been widely studied among 
others by Fishburn, 1973; Fishburn et al., 1979; Kemeny, 1959; Moulin, 
1985; Truchon, 1995; Young and Levenglick, 1978, Vidu, 2002; Weber, 
2002. The probability ( ),N M of obtain a cycle with N countries and M
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individual indicators increases with N as well as with the number of 
indicators. With many countries and individual indicators, cycles occur 
with an extremely high frequency. Therefore, the ranking procedure used 
has to deal with the cycle issue properly. 
5. Arrow’s impossibility theorem (Arrow, 1963) clearly shows that no 
perfect aggregation convention can exist. Then, it is essential to check not 
only which properties are respected by a given ranking procedure, but also 
if any essential property for the problem tackled is lost. 
 
3.3 The proposed composite indicator 
The mathematical aggregation convention we are proposing can be divided into 
two main steps: 
1. Pair-wise comparison of countries according to the whole set of individual 
indicators used. 
2. Ranking of countries in a complete pre-order.  
 
For carrying out the pair-wise comparison of countries the following axiomatic 
system is needed (adapted from Arrow and Raynaud, 1986, p. 81-82). 
Axiom 1: Diversity. Each individual indicator is a total order on the finite set A of
countries to be ranked, and there is no restriction on the individual indicators; they 
can be any total order on A. 
Axiom 2: Symmetry. Since individual indicators have incommensurable scales, the 
only preference information they provide is the ordinal pair-wise preferences they 
contain6.
Axiom 3: Positive Responsiveness. The degree of preference between two 
countries a and b is a strictly increasing function of the number and weights of 
individual indicators that rank a before b7.
6 In our case, this axiom is needed since the intensity of preference of individual indicators is not 
considered an useful preference information given that compensability has to be avoided and 
weights have to be symmetrical importance coefficients. Moreover, thanks to this axiom, a 
normalisation step is not needed. This causes a further reduction of the sources of uncertainty and 
imprecise assessment. 
7 In social choice terms then the anonymity property (i.e. equal treatment of all individual 
indicators) is broken. Indeed, given that full decisiveness yields to dictatorship, Arrow’s 
impossibility theorem forces us to make a trade-off between decisiveness (an alternative has to be 
chosen or a ranking has to be made) and anonymity. In our case the loss of anonymity in favour of 
decisiveness is even a positive property. In general, it is essential that no individual indicator 
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Thanks to these three axioms a N×N matrix, E, called outranking matrix 
(Arrow and Raynaud, 1986, Roy, 1996) can be built. Any generic element of E: 
ejk , j	 k is the result of the pair-wise comparison, according to all the M
individual indicators, between countries j and k. Such a global pair-wise 
comparison is obtained by means of equation (2). 
 
1
1( ) ( )2
M
jk m mjk jk
m
P Ie w w
=
 = +   (3) 
where ( )m jkw P and ( )m jkw I are the weights of individual indicators presenting a 
preference and an indifference relation respectively. It clearly holds   
 
ejk + ekj = 1. (4) 
 
Property (4), although obvious, is very important since it allows us to 
consider the outranking matrix E as a voting matrix i.e., a matrix where instead of 
using individual indicators, alternatives are compared by means of voters’ 
preferences (with the principle one agent one vote). This analogy between a 
multi-criterion problem and a social choice one, as noted by Arrow and Raynaud 
(1986), is very useful for tackling the step of ranking the N countries in a 
consistent axiomatic framework.  
The issue is now to exploit the information contained in the outranking matrix 
in order to rank all countries in a complete pre-order. A problem connected with 
the use of Condorcet consistent rules is that of cycles. A cycle breaking rule 
normally needs some arbitrary choices such as to delete the cycle with the lowest 
support. Now the question is: Is it possible to tackle the cycle issue in a more 
general way? 
 Condorcet himself was aware of the problem of cycles in his approach; he 
built examples to explain it and he was even close to find a consistent rule able to 
rank any number of alternatives when cycles are present. However, attempts to 
fully understand this part of Condorcet’s voting theory have arrived at 
 
weight is more than 50% of the total weight; otherwise the aggregation procedure would become 
lexicographic in nature, and the indicator would become a dictator in Arrow’s term.  
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conclusions like “… the general rules for the case of any number of candidates as 
given by Condorcet are stated so briefly as to be hardly intelligible … and as no 
examples are given it is quite hopeless to find out what Condorcet meant” (E.J. 
Nanson as quoted in Black, 1958, p. 175). Or “The obscurity and self-
contradiction are without any parallel, so far as our experience of mathematical 
works extends … no amount of examples can convey an adequate impression of 
the evils” (Todhunter, 1949, p. 352 as cited by Young, 1988, p. 1234). 
 Attempts of clarifying, fully understanding and axiomatizing Condorcet’s 
approach for solving cycles have been mainly done by Kemeny (1959) who made 
the first intelligible description of the Condorcet approach, and by Young and 
Levenglick (1978) who made its clearest exposition and complete axiomatization. 
 In the version presented by Young and Levenglick (1978), the main 
methodological foundation is the maximum likelihood concept. In fact, 
“Condorcet’s argument proceeds along the following lines. People differ in their 
opinions because they are imperfect judges of which decision really is best. If on 
balance each voter is more often right than wrong, however, then the majority 
view is very likely to identify the decision that is objectively best.” (Young, 1988, 
p. 1232). 
 The maximum likelihood principle selects as a final ranking the one with the 
maximum pair-wise support. This selected ranking is the one which involves the 
minimum number of pair-wise inversions. Since Kemeny (1959) proposes the 
number of pair-wise inversions as a distance to be minimized between the 
selected ranking and the other individual profiles, the two approaches are 
perfectly equivalent. A formal proof of this equivalence can be found in Truchon 
(1988b, pp. 6-10). The selected ranking is also a median ranking for those 
composing the profile (in multi-criteria terminology it is the “compromise 
ranking” among the various conflicting points of view), for this reason the 
corresponding ranking procedure is often known as the Kemeny median order.  
 Arrow and Raynaud (1986, p. 77) arrive at the conclusion that the highest 
feasible ambition for an aggregation algorithm building a multi-criterion ranking 
is to be Condorcet. These authors discard the Kemeny median order, on the 
grounds that preference reversal phenomena may occur inside this approach 
(Arrow and Raynaud, 1986, p. 96). However, although the so-called Arrow-
Raynaud’s method does not present rank reversal, it is not applicable if cycles 
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exist. Since in the context where composite indicators are built, cycles are very 
probable to occur, here the only solution is to follow Kemeny rule (or the 
equivalent maximum likelihood ranking procedure), thus accepting that rank 
reversals might appear8.
The acceptance of rank reversals phenomena implies that the famous axiom of 
independence of irrelevant alternatives of Arrow’s theorem is not respected. 
Anyway, Young (1988, p. 1241) claims that the maximum likelihood ranking 
procedure is the “only plausible ranking procedure that is locally stable”. Where 
local stability means that the ranking of alternatives does not change if only an 
interval of the full ranking is considered.  
 The adaptation of the maximum likelihood ranking procedure to the ranking 
problem we are dealing with is very simple (Author, 2005). The maximum 
likelihood ranking of countries is the ranking supported by the maximum number 
of individual indicators for each pair-wise comparison, summed over all pairs of 
countries considered. More formally, all the N(N–1) pair-wise comparisons 
compose the outranking matrix E, where ejk + ekj = 1, with j	 k. Call R the set of 
all N! possible complete rankings of alternatives, R={rs}, s=1,2,..., N!. For each 
rs, compute the corresponding score  s as the summation of ejk over all the 



2
N
pairs j,k of alternatives, i.e.  
= e jks . (5) 
 
reandNskjwhere sjk=	 !...,2,1,
The final ranking ( r* ) is the one which maximises equation (6), which is:  
 
Rewhereer jkjk = max**  . (6) 
 
Other properties of this ranking procedure are the following (Young and 
Levenglick, 1978). 
 
8 Anyway a Condorcet consistent rule always presents smaller probabilities of the occurrence of a 
rank reversal in comparison with any Borda consistent rule. This is again a strong argument in 
favour of a Condorcet’s approach in our framework. 
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• Neutrality: it does not depend on the name of any country, all countries 
are equally treated. 
• Unanimity (sometimes called Pareto Optimality): if all individual 
indicators prefer country a to country b than b should not be chosen. 
• Monotonicity: if country a is chosen in any pair-wise comparison and only 
the individual indicator scores (i.e. the variables) of a are improved, then a
should be still the winning country.  
• Reinforcement: if the set A of countries is ranked by 2 subsets G1 and G2
of the individual indicator set G, such that the ranking is the same for both 
G1 and G2, then GGG = 21 should still supply the same ranking. This 
general consistency requirement is very important in the framework of 
composite indicators, since one may wish to apply the individual 
indicators belonging to each single dimension first and then pool them in 
the general model. It has to be noted that the maximum likelihood ranking 
procedure is the only Condorcet consistent rule which holds the 
reinforcement property and as noted by Arrow and Raynaud, 
reinforcement “… has definite ethical content and is therefore relevant to 
welfare economics and political science.” (Arrow and Raynaud, 1986, p. 
96).  
 
3.4 The computational problem 
 Moulin (1988, p. 312) clearly states that the Kemeny method (or equivalently 
the maximum likelihood approach) is “the correct method” for ranking 
alternatives, and that the “only drawback of this aggregation method is the 
difficulty in computing it when the number of candidates grows”. In fact the 
number of permutations can easily become unmanageable; for example when 10 
countries are present, it is 10!=3,628,800. Indeed this computational drawback is 
very serious since the Kemeny median order is NP-hard to compute.  This NP-
hardness has discouraged the development of algorithms searching for exact 
solutions, thus the majority of the algorithms which have been proposed in the 
literature; are mainly heuristics based on artificial intelligence, branch and bound 
approaches and multi-stage techniques (see e.g., Barthelemy et al., 1989; Charon 
et al., 1997; Cohen et al., 1999; Davenport and Kalagnam, 2004; Dwork et al., 
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2001; Truchon, 1998b). Recently, a new numerical algorithm aimed at solving the 
computational problem connected to linear median orders by finding exact 
solutions has been developed too (Author, 2006b).  
 Thanks to the existence of all these computational algorithms, the maximum 
likelihood (or Kemeny) ranking procedure can always be applied in the context of 
composite indicators, where a high number of countries to be ranked is the normal 
state of affairs. 
 
3.5 A sensitive issue: is information on intensity of preference complete lost 
in a Condorcet framework? 
Given that the preference structure is based on equation (2), one might wonder 
if information on intensity of preference (when variables are measured on an 
interval or ratio scale) is completely lost in a Condorcet framework (since small 
and big intensities are treated equally). The problem is indeed very old. Its origins 
may be found in the famous bold paradox in Greek philosophy: how many hairs 
one has to cut off to transform a person with hairs to a bold one? Luce (1956) was 
the first one to discuss this issue formally in the framework of preference 
modelling. He introduced the idea of the existence of a sensibility threshold below 
which an agent either does not sense the difference between two elements, or 
refuses to declare a preference for one or the other. Mathematical 
characterisations of preference modelling with thresholds can be found in 
Roubens and Vincke (1985). 
 By introducing a positive indifference threshold q the resulting preference 
model is the so-called threshold model: 






 
+>
qagagaIa
qagagaPa
kmjmkj
kmjmkj
)()(
)()(
(7) 
 
where aj and ak belong to the set A of countries and gm to the set G of individual 
indicators. If one wishes to take into account the possible uncertainty around the 
value of the threshold q, sensitivity analysis and robustness analyses can be used 
(Saltelli et al., 2004), another possibility is the use of mathematical sophisticated 
concept such as the one of fuzzy preference modelling (Author, 1995). 
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Finally, one should note that the intensity of preference can easily used in the 
benchmarking step, where is not the ranking but the distance from a reference 
point what matters. For the majority of indicators used in assessment exercises no 
clear reference point is available, for instance, when GDP is used nobody knows 
the ideal value of a Country GDP, thus it is quite common to compare with other 
Countries GDP, e.g. the USA one. A first very simple benchmarking procedure 
can be the application of a normalisation rule known as “distance from the group 
leader”, which assigns 100 to the leading country in that particular individual 
indicator and other countries are ranked as percentage points away from the leader 
(OECD, 2003). More elegant approaches can be based on the so-called ideal point 
approaches, which is a well established technique in multi-criteria evaluation 
literature (see e.g. Yu, 1985; Zeleny, 1982). In this framework, to get a set of 
reference values, an “ideal point” can be defined by choosing the best values 
reached in any single indicator, and then mathematical distances are used.  
3.6 An Illustrative numerical example 
 Let’s take into consideration a simple hypothetical example where there are 
three countries (A, B, C) to be ranked according to a composite sustainability 
indicator. Let’s assume that three dimensions have to be considered, i.e. the 
economic, the social and the environmental ones, and that each dimension should 
have the same weight, that is 0.3333.  
The following individual indicators are used 
Economic dimension
Indicator: GDP per capita. Weight: 0.165. Objective: maximisation of economic 
growth. Variable: US dollar per year. 
Indicator: Unemployment rate. Weight: 0.165. Objective: minimisation of 
unemployed people. Variable: percentage of population. 
Environmental dimension
Indicator: Solid waste generated per capita. Weight: 0.333. Objective: 
minimisation of environmental impact. Variable: tons per year. 
Social dimension
Indicator: Income disparity. Weight: 0.165. Objective: minimisation of 
distributional inequity. Variable: Q5/Q1. 
Page 16 of 51
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
Manuscript submitted to Applied Economics 
17
Indicator: Crime rate. Weight: 0.165. Objective: minimisation of criminality. 
Variable: robberies per 1000 inhabitants. 
 
The impact matrix described in Table 1 can then be constructed. 
 
Indicators GDP Unemp. rate Solid waste Inc. dispar. Crime rate 
Countries       
A 22,000 0.17 0.4 10.5 40 
B 45,000 0.09 0,45 11.0 45 
C 20,000 0.08 0.35 5.3 80 
Table 1. Impact matrix of the illustrative numerical example 
 
Considering axioms 1, 2 and 3, and equation (3), the following pair-wise 
comparisons hold: 
AB=0.333+0.165+0.165=0.6669
BA=0.165+0.165=0.333 
AC=0.165+0.165=0.333 
CA=0.165+0.333+0.165=0.666 
BC=0.165+0.165=0.333 
CB=0.165+0.333+0.165=0.666 
 
These results can be synthesised in the outranking matrix: 
 
0 0.666 0.333
0.333 0 0.333
0.666 0.666 0
A B C
AE B
C
! "# $# $= # $# $% &
By applying the C-K-Y-L rule to the 3! possible rankings it is: 
 
ABC =1 0.666 + 0.333 + 0.333 = 1.333 
BCA = 2 0.333 + 0.333 + 0.666 = 1.333 
 
9 Comparing A with B it turns out that A stands out according to the indicators Solid wastes 
(weight 0.333), Income disparity (weight 0.165) and Crime rate (weight (0.165). 
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CAB =3 0.666 + 0.666 + 0.666 = 2 
ACB = 4 0.333 + 0.666 + 0.666 = 1.666 
BAC =5 0.333 + 0.333 + 0.333 = 1 
CBA =6 0.666 + 0.666 + 0.333 = 1.666 
 
The final ranking r* is then CAB.  
Notice that using one of the standard ways to produce a composite indicator the 
result would be different. If for each country the composite indicator is calculated 
as difference from the group leader (which assigns 100 to the leading country and 
ranks the others as percentage points away from the leader), the impact matrix 
becomes: 
 
Indicators GDP Unemp. rate Solid waste Inc. dispar. Crime rate 
Countries       
A 48.9 47.05 87.5 50.5 100 
B 100 88.9 77.8 48.2 88.9 
C 44.4 100 100 100 50 
Table 2. Impact matrix: distance from the leader 
 
The index will be calculated averaging each indicator (with the same weights as 
in the multi-criterion matrix) obtaining AI =69.8, BI = 79.7, and CI =81.9. The 
ranking would be CBA, different from what found with our algorithm. 
 
It is interesting to note that the only sources of uncertainty and imprecision 
assessment left in the mathematical modelling of the composite indicator 
proposed are: 
1. The scale adjustment technique used (neither normalisation nor a common 
measurement unit are needed). 
2. The values of weights attached to dimensions and individual indicators. 
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As a consequence, these sources of uncertainty and imprecision assessment are 
reduced at the minimum possible level and a sensitivity analysis of the results is 
much easier to carry out than any other composite indicator.  
 
4. A Real-World Application: the Environmental Sustainability 
Index  
The "Environmental Sustainability Index" (ESI) for 2005 is produced by a 
team of environmental researchers from the Yale and Columbia Universities, in 
co-operation with the World Economic Forum and the EU's Joint Research 
Centre.   
The aim of the ESI is that of benchmarking the ability of 146 nations to protect 
the environment over the next decades, by integrating 76 data sets into 21 
indicators of environmental sustainability (see Esty at al., 2005). The data base 
used to construct the ESI covers a wide range of aspects of environmental 
sustainability ranging from variables measuring the physical state and stress of the 
environmental systems (like natural resource depletion, pollution, ecosystem 
destruction), to the more general social and institutional capacity to respond to 
environmental challenges. Poverty, short-term thinking and lack of investment in 
capacity and infrastructure committed to pollution control and ecosystem 
protection thus compete in determining the measure of a country’s sustainability. 
Although the official ESI ranking is based upon the linear aggregation of 21 
equally weighted indicators, in the methodological appendix, an attempt has been 
made to apply the non-compensatory approach presented here, in order to tackle 
the issue of weights as “importance measure” and the compensability of different 
and crucial dimension of environmental sustainability (see the Methodological 
Appendix in Esty et al., 2005). 
Figure 1 compares the ranking obtained by means of the non-compensatory 
aggregation rule with the one of the ESI2005. In both cases all 21 indicators are 
equally weighted. From this figure it is clear that the aggregation method used 
affects principally the middle-of-the-road and, to a lesser extent, the leader and 
the laggard countries. Overall for the set of 146 countries, the assumption on the 
aggregation scheme has an average impact of 8 ranks and a rank-order correlation 
coefficient of 0.962. In particular, while the top 50 countries only move on 
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average by 5 positions, the following 50 countries move on average by 12 
positions and the latter 46 countries by 8 positions.  
 
y = 0.9623x + 2.7684
R2 = 0.9261
0
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Figure 1. Comparison of rankings obtained by the linear aggregation 
(ESI2005) and the non-compensatory (NCMA) rules 
It is important to underline that although both aggregation schemes seem to 
produce consistent rankings (the R2 is 0.92), those rankings do not nevertheless 
coincide. Using the non-compensatory approach, 43 out of 146 countries display a 
change in rank higher than 10 positions (none before the 30th ESI rank). When 
compensability among indicators is not allowed, countries having very poor 
performance in some indicators, such as Indonesia or Armenia worsen their rank 
with respect to the linear yardstick, whereas countries that have less extreme 
values improve their situation, such as Azerbaijan or Spain. Table 3 shows the 
countries displaying the largest variation in their ranks. 
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Aggregation ESI rank 
with LIN 
rank with 
NCMC 
Change 
in Rank 
Azerbaijan  99 61 38 
Spain  76 45 31 
Nigeria  98 69 29 
South 
Africa  93 68 25 Im
pro
ve
me
nt
Burundi  130 107 23 
Indonesia  75 114 39 
Armenia  44 79 35 
Ecuador  51 78 27 
Turkey  91 115 24 De
ter
ior
ati
on
Sri Lanka  79 101 22 
Average change over 146 countries 8
Table 3. ESI rankings obtained by linear aggregation (LIN) and non-
compensatory rule (NCMC): countries that largely improve or worsen their 
rank position 
 
5. Conclusion 
 This article has firstly investigated the axiomatic system behind the 
mathematical modelling of standard composite indicators. The following main 
conclusions can be drawn: 
1. The assumption of preference independence is essential for the existence 
of a linear aggregation rule. Given to its computational complexity, the 
test of mutual preferential independence is often not done in real-world 
practice. Moreover, this assumption has very strong consequences which 
often are not desirable in a composite indicator.  
2. Weights in linear aggregation rules have always the meaning of trade-off 
ratio. The specification of weights as trade-off is a very complex 
procedure, for this reason often in practice they are treated as importance 
coefficients. If weights with the meaning of importance coefficients are 
used, then a Condorcet approach is needed for axiomatic consistency 
reasons. 
3. In standard composite indicators based on the linear aggregation rule, 
compensability among the different individual indicators is always 
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assumed; this implies complete substitutability among the various 
components considered; this characteristics may not be desirable in many 
operational frameworks.  
 
A Condorcet consistent non-compensatory/non-linear mathematical aggregation 
convention for the construction of composite indicators aimed at ranking 
countries has been developed here. This mathematical aggregation convention can 
be divided into two main steps: 
• pair-wise comparison of countries to be ranked, 
• ranking of countries in a complete pre-order. 
 
Weights are never combined with intensities of preference, as a consequence the 
theoretical guarantee they are importance coefficients is assured. Since intensities 
of preference are not used the degree of compensability connected with the 
aggregation model is at the minimum possible level. Given that the summation of 
weights is equal to one, the pair-wise comparisons can be synthesised in an 
outranking matrix, which can be interpreted as a voting matrix.  
 The information contained in the voting matrix is exploited to rank all 
alternatives in a complete pre-order by using a Condorcet consistent rule. A 
problem connected with the use of Condorcet consistent rules is the one of cycles. 
A cycle breaking rule normally needs some arbitrary choices such as to delete the 
cycle with the lowest support, and so on. A non-arbitrary cycle breaking rule is 
the so-called Kemeny median order which coincides with the maximum 
likelihood ranking proposed by Young and Levenglick.   
 Of course the approach we are proposing is not the “first best” possible 
approach for the construction of composite indicators.  It is a “second best” 
approach based on theoretical and empirical grounds, which makes assumptions 
explicit and thus easier to be evaluated in relation with a particular use. This 
increases both the coherence and the transparency of the ranking obtained. One 
has to remember, however, that Arrow’s theorem implies that some useful and 
desirable properties in an aggregation convention are always lost. Here the 
properties lost are anonymity (which does not constitute a problem since weights 
are explicitly allowed and decisiveness is gained) and independence of irrelevant 
alternatives (which on the contrary is a serious loss since rank reversals may 
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appear). Furthermore, information on intensity of preference of variables is never 
used. This loss of information is a necessary price to pay for guaranteeing that 
compensability is reduced and that weights can be considered as symmetrical 
importance coefficients. However, information on the intensity of preference can 
be partly used if indifference thresholds are used. Moreover, ranking procedures 
can be complemented with benchmarking exercises which are fully based on the 
use of intensity of preference (of course when variables are measured on an 
interval or ratio scale). 
 Finally, one has to note that the overall quality of any composite indicator 
depends on the following elements: 
1. information available (often data to measure variables are unreliable or simply 
missing; thus garbage in, garbage out phenomena may easily occur 
(Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1990)); 
2. individual indicators and variable chosen (i.e. which representation of reality 
is used). This, to a large extent, determines interpretability of an index. 
3. direction of each indicator (i.e. the bigger the better or vice versa, sometimes 
this decision is not that easy); 
4. relative importance of these indicators (weights attached which are one of the 
main sources of technical uncertainty of the results provided; methodological 
discussion and sensitivity analysis are necessary to tackle this uncertainty by 
making it explicit); 
5. mathematical aggregation convention used (the present paper has dealt with 
this step). 
 
The quality of the aggregation convention is, yet, an important ingredient to 
guarantee the consistency between the assumptions used and the ranking 
obtained. Indeed, the overall quality of a composite indicator depends crucially on 
the way this mathematical model is embedded in the social, political and technical 
structuring process (Munda, 2004). This is especially true for the choice of 
weights that remains the most important source of uncertainty and debate. We 
have the firm conviction that weights are and must be context-dependent in that 
they reflect political, social and economic priorities and depend on the 
development model a country (or a group of countries) wants to pursue. Often we 
have seen policymakers using the umbrella of “science” to disguise lobbies, 
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individual interests, or incompetence. Again, whatever aggregations procedure is 
used, we think that transparency must remain one of the main ingredients: without 
transparency the interpretability and coherence of indicators are difficult to 
achieve.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Area  / Name of Composite Indicator 
Economy 
 Composite of Leading Indicators (OECD) 
 OECD International Regulation database (OECD) 
 Economic Sentiment Indicator (EC) 
 Internal Market Index (EC) 
 Business Climate Indicator (EC) 
Environment 
 Environmental Sustainability Index (World Economic Forum) 
 Wellbeing Index (Prescott-Allen) 
 Sustainable Development Index (UN) 
 Synthetic Environmental Indices (Isla M.) 
 Eco-Indicator 99 (Pre Consultants) 
 Concern about Environmental Problems (Parker) 
 Index of Environmental Friendliness (Puolamaa) 
 Environmental Policy Performance Index (Adriaanse) 
Globalisation 
 Global Competitiveness Report (World Economic Forum) 
 Transnationality Index (UNCTAD) 
 Globalisation Index (A.T. Kearny) 
 Globalisation Index (World Markets Research Centre) 
Society 
 Human Development Index (UN) 
 Overall Health Attainment (WHO) 
 National Health Care Systems Performance (King’s Fund) 
 Relative Intensity of  Regional Problems (EC) 
 Employment Index (Storrie and Bjurek) 
Innovation/ Technology 
 Summary Innovation Index (EC) 
 Networked Readiness Index (CID) 
 National Innovation Capacity Index (Porter and  Stern) 
 Investment in Knowledge-Based Economy (EC) 
 Performance in Knowledge-Based Economy (EC) 
 Technology Achievement Index (UN) 
 General Indicator of Science and Technology (NISTEP) 
 Information and Communications Technologies Index (Fagerberg) 
 Success of Software Process Improvement (Emam) 
Table 4. Examples of composite indicators 
Source: Saisana and Tarantola, 2002, cited in OECD 2003, p. 4 
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Abstract: Composite indicators (or indexes) are very common in economic and 
business statistics for benchmarking the mutual and relative progress of countries in a 
variety of policy domains such as industrial competitiveness, sustainable 
development, globalisation and innovation. The proliferation of the production of 
composite indicators by all the major international organizations is a clear symptom 
of their political importance and operational relevance in policy-making. As a 
consequence, improvements in the way these indicators are constructed and used 
seem to be a very important research issue from both the theoretical and operational 
points of view. This paper aims at contributing to the improvement of the overall 
quality of composite indicators (or indexes) by looking at one of their technical 
weaknesses, that is, the aggregation convention used for their construction. For this 
aim, we build upon concepts coming from multi-criteria decision analysis, 
measurement theory and social choice. We start from the analysis of the axiomatic 
system underlying the mathematical modelling commonly used to construct 
composite indicators. Then a different methodological framework, based on non-
compensatory/non-linear aggregation rules, is developed. Main features of the 
proposed approach are: (i) the axiomatic system is made completely explicit, and (ii)
the sources of technical uncertainty and imprecise assessment are reduced to the 
minimum possible degree.
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1. Introduction
Composite indicators (along all this paper the term composite indicator is used as 
a synonymous of index) are very common in fields such as economic and business 
statistics (e.g., Öcal 2006, Binner et al. 1999 and 2006 or the OECD Composite 
of Leading Indicators) and are used in a variety of policy domains such as 
industrial competitiveness, sustainable development, quality of life assessment, 
globalisation, innovation or academic performance (see Cox and others 1992, 
Cribari-Neto et al 1999, Färe et al. 1994, Griliches 1990, Forni et al. 2001, 
Huggins 2003, Grupp and Mogee 2004, Lovell et al. 1995, Munda 2005, Nardo et 
al. 2005, Saisana and Tarantola 2002, and Wilson and Jones 2002, among others). 
The proliferation of composite indicators is a clear symptom of their importance 
in policy-making, and operational relevance in economic statistics in general (see 
e.g. Granger, 2001). All the major international organizations such as OECD, the 
EU, the World Economic Forum or the IMF are producing composite indicators 
in a wide variety of fields (Nardo et al., 2005). A general objective of most of 
these indicators is the ranking of countries and their benchmarking according to 
some aggregated dimensions (see e.g. Cherchye, 2001, Kleinknecht 2002 and 
OECD, 2003). 
The improvement of the way composite indicators are constructed and used 
seems to be a very important research issue from both theoretical and operational 
points of view. Our main objective in this article is to contribute to the 
improvement of the overall quality of composite indicators by looking at one of 
their technical weaknesses, that is, the aggregation convention used for their 
construction. For this aim, we build upon concepts coming from multi-criteria 
decision analysis, measurement theory and social choice.
Although various functional forms for the underlying aggregation rules of a 
composite indicator have been developed in the literature (e.g. Diewert, 1976, 
Journal of Economic and Social Measurement, 2002), in the standard practice, a 
composite indicator I, can be considered a weighted linear aggregation rule 
applied to a set of variables (OECD, 2003, p. 5): 
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1
N
i i
i
I w x
=
= ,                                                                                                      (1)
where ix  is a scale adjusted variable (e.g. GDP per capita) normalized between 
zero and one, and iw a weight attached to ix , usually with 
1
1
N
i
i
w
=
=  and 
0 1iw  , 1, 2,..., .i N=
Munda and Nardo (2006) analyse the formal axioms behind the linear 
aggregation rule and their operational implications and conclude that the use of 
non-linear aggregation rules to construct composite indicators is compulsory for 
reasons of theoretical consistency when weights with the meaning of importance 
coefficients1 are used or when the assumption of preferential independence does 
not hold. Moreover, in standard linear composite indicators, compensability 
among the different individual indicators is always assumed; this implies 
complete substitutability among the various components considered. For example, 
in a hypothetical sustainability index, economic growth can always substitute any 
environmental destruction or inside e.g., the environmental dimension, clean air 
can compensate for a loss of potable water. From a normative point of view, such 
a complete compensability is often not desirable.
Vansnick (1990) showed that the two main approaches in multi-criteria 
aggregation procedures i.e., the compensatory and non-compensatory ones can be 
directly derived from the seminal work in social choice of Borda (father of the 
compensatory approach) and Condorcet (father of the non-compensatory 
approach)2. If one wants the weights to be interpreted as “importance 
coefficients” (or equivalently symmetrical importance of variables) non-
compensatory aggregation procedures must be used (Bouyssou, 1986; Bouyssou 
and Vansnick, 1986). The majority rule is theoretically the most desirable 
aggregation rule, but practically often produces undesirable intransitivities, thus 
1
 In the decision theory literature, this concept of weights as importance coefficients is usually 
referred to as symmetrical importance, that is "… if we have two non-equal numbers to construct a 
vector in R2, then it is preferable to place the greatest number in the position corresponding to the 
most important criterion." (Podinovskii, 1994, p. 241).
2
 Ebert and Welsch (2004) also propose the use social choice to improve the theoretical framework 
of environmental indexes.
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“more limited ambitions are compulsory. The next highest ambition for an 
aggregation algorithm is to be Condorcet” (Arrow and Raynaud, 1986, p. 77). 
Finally, one should note that to use a linear aggregation rule, the assumption 
that the variable scores are measured on an interval or ratio scale of measurement 
and no uncertainty exists must always apply. Rarely this happens in the practice 
of composite indicators, where for instance, sometimes quantitative scores are 
arbitrarily given to variable scores originally measured on an ordinal 
measurement scale (see e.g. Nicoletti et al., 2000). On the contrary, by using 
Condorcet aggregation rules no limitation on the measurement scale of the 
variable scores exists.
For all these reasons, we think that in some applications the use of non-
linear/non-compensatory Condorcet consistent aggregation rules is desirable. 
Since this possibility has almost never been explored in the framework of 
composite indicators the following Section is devoted to this issue.
2. An Axiomatic Approach for the Construction of Non-
Compensatory/Non-Linear Condorcet Consistent Composite 
Indicators
For the sake of clearness, some basic definitions are first given. These 
definitions are adapted to the context of composite indicators borrowing concepts 
from multi-criteria decision theory and complex system theory3.
2.1 Basic definitions
Dimension: is the highest hierarchical level of analysis and indicates the scope of 
objectives, individual indicators and variables. For example, a sustainability 
composite indicator can include economic, social and environmental dimensions.
Objective: an objective indicates the direction of change desired. For example, 
within the economic dimension GDP has to be maximised; within the social 
dimension social exclusion has to be minimised; within the environmental 
dimension CO2 emissions have to be minimised.
3 Some of these definitions were inspired by discussions with M. Giampietro.
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Individual indicator: it is the basis for evaluation in relation to a given objective 
(any objective may imply a number of different individual indicators). It is a 
function that associates each single country with a variable indicating its 
desirability according to expected consequences related to the same objective.  
For example, GDP, saving rate and inflation rate inside the objective “growth 
maximisation”.
Variable: is a constructed measure stemming from a process that represents, at a 
given point in space and time, a shared perception of a real-world state of affairs 
consistent with a given individual indicator. To give an example, in comparing 
two countries, inside the economic dimension, one objective can be 
“maximisation of economic growth”; the individual indicator might be R&D 
performance, the indicator score or variable can be “number of patents per million 
of inhabitants”.  Another example: an objective connected with the social
dimension can be “maximisation of the residential attractiveness”. A possible 
individual indicator is then “residential density”. The variable providing the 
individual indicator score might be the ratio persons per hectare.
A composite indicator or synthetic index is an aggregate of all dimensions, 
objectives, individual indicators and variables used. This implies that what 
formally defines a composite indicator is the set of properties underlying its 
aggregation convention. The rest of this section deals with this issue.
When various individual indicators are used to evaluate two different 
countries, some of these individual indicators may be in favour of country a while 
other variables may be in favour of country b. As a consequence a conflict among 
the individual indicators exists. How this conflict can be treated at the light of a 
non-linear/non-compensatory logic? This is the classical multi-criteria discrete 
problem (Munda, 1995; Roy, 1996; Vincke, 1992). With this analogy in mind, we 
present an aggregation convention for (non-linear and non-compensatory) 
composite indicators able to rank different countries (or regions, cities and so on).
2.2 Problem definition
Given a set of individual indicators G={gm}, m=1,2,..., M, and a finite set 
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A={an}, n=1, 2,..., N of countries, let’s assume that the variable (i.e. the individual 
indicator score) of each country an with respect to an individual indicator gm is 
based on an ordinal, interval or ratio scale of measurement. For simplicity of 
exposition, we assume that a higher value of a variable is preferred to a lower one 
(i.e. the higher, the better), that is:



=
>
)()(
)()(
agagaIa
agagaPa
kmjmkj
kmjmkj (2) 
 
Where, P and I indicate a preference and an indifference relation respectively,
both fulfilling the transitive property. 
Let’s also assume the existence of a set of individual indicator weights 
W={wm}, m=1,2,...,M, with 
=
=
M
m
mw
1
1 , derived as importance coefficients. The 
mathematical problem to be dealt with is then how to use this available 
information to rank in a complete pre-order (i.e. without any incomparability 
relation) all the countries from the best to the worst one. In doing so the following 
operational properties are desirable:
1. The sources of uncertainty and imprecise assessment should be reduced as 
much as possible.
2. The manipulation rules should be the more objective and as simple as 
possible, that is all ad hoc parameters should be avoided. 
3. A theoretical guarantee that weights are used with the meaning of 
“symmetrical importance” must exist. As a consequence, complete 
compensability should be avoided. This entails that variables have to be 
used with an ordinal meaning. This is not a problem since no loss of 
information is implied (Arrow and Raynaud, 1986). Moreover, given that 
often the measurement of variables is imprecise (see OECD, 2003, p.7), it 
seems even desirable to use indicator scores with an ordinal meaning.
4. Desirable ranking procedures using ordinal information are always of a 
Condorcet type (Arrow and Raynaud, 1986, Moulin, 1988). A problem 
inherent to this family of algorithm is the presence of cycles, i.e. cases 
where aPb, bPc and cPa. This problem has been widely studied among 
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7
others by Fishburn, 1973; Fishburn et al., 1979; Kemeny, 1959; Moulin, 
1985; Truchon, 1995; Young and Levenglick, 1978, Vidu, 2002; Weber, 
2002. The probability ( ),N M  of obtain a cycle with N countries and M
individual indicators increases with N as well as with the number of 
indicators. With many countries and individual indicators, cycles occur 
with an extremely high frequency. Therefore, the ranking procedure used 
has to deal with the cycle issue properly.
5. Arrow’s impossibility theorem (Arrow, 1963) clearly shows that no 
perfect aggregation convention can exist. Then, it is essential to check not 
only which properties are respected by a given ranking procedure, but also 
if any essential property for the problem tackled is lost.
2.3 The proposed composite indicator
The mathematical aggregation convention we are proposing can be divided into 
two main steps:
1. Pair-wise comparison of countries according to the whole set of individual 
indicators used.
2. Ranking of countries in a complete pre-order. 
For carrying out the pair-wise comparison of countries the following axiomatic 
system is needed (adapted from Arrow and Raynaud, 1986, p. 81-82).
Axiom 1: Diversity.  Each individual indicator is a total order on the finite set A of 
countries to be ranked, and there is no restriction on the individual indicators; they 
can be any total order on A.
Axiom 2: Symmetry. Since individual indicators have incommensurable scales, the 
only preference information they provide is the ordinal pair-wise preferences they 
contain4.
Axiom 3: Positive Responsiveness. The degree of preference between two 
countries a and b is a strictly increasing function of the number and weights of 
individual indicators that rank a before b5. 
4 In our case, this axiom is needed since the intensity of preference (i.e. the difference between 2 
variables measured on an interval or ratio scale) of individual indicators is not considered useful
preference information given that compensability has to be avoided and weights have to be 
symmetrical importance coefficients. Moreover, thanks to this axiom, a normalisation step is not 
needed. This causes a further reduction of the sources of uncertainty and imprecise assessment.
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8
Thanks to these three axioms a N×N matrix, E, called outranking matrix
(Arrow and Raynaud, 1986, Roy, 1996) can be built. Any generic element of  the 
matrix E, ejk , j k is the result of the pair-wise comparison, according to all the 
M individual indicators, between countries j and k. Such a global pair-wise 
comparison is obtained by means of equation (2).
1
1( ) ( )
2
M
jk m mjk jk
m
P Ie w w
=
 = + 
 

(3)
 
where ( )
m jkw P and ( )m jkw I  are the weights of individual indicators presenting a 
preference and an indifference relation respectively. It clearly holds 
ejk + ekj = 1. (4) 
 
Property (4), although obvious, is very important since it allows us to consider 
the outranking matrix E as a voting matrix i.e., a matrix where instead of using 
individual indicators, alternatives are compared by means of voters’ preferences 
(with the principle one agent one vote). This analogy between a multi-criterion 
problem and a social choice one, as noted by Arrow and Raynaud (1986), is very 
useful for tackling the step of ranking the N countries in a consistent axiomatic 
framework. 
The issue is now to exploit the information contained in the outranking matrix 
in order to rank all countries in a complete pre-order. A problem connected with 
the use of Condorcet consistent rules is that of cycles. A cycle breaking rule 
normally needs some arbitrary choices such as to delete the cycle with the lowest 
support. Now the question is: Is it possible to tackle the cycle issue in a more 
general way?
5 In social choice terms then the anonymity property (i.e. equal treatment of all individual 
indicators) is broken. Indeed, given that full decisiveness yields to dictatorship, Arrow’s 
impossibility theorem forces us to make a trade-off between decisiveness (an alternative has to be 
chosen or a ranking has to be made) and anonymity. In our case the loss of anonymity in favour of 
decisiveness is even a positive property. In general, it is essential that no individual indicator
weight is more than 50% of the total weight; otherwise the aggregation procedure would become 
lexicographic in nature, and the indicator would become a dictator in Arrow’s term.
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9
Condorcet himself was aware of the problem of cycles in his approach; he 
built examples to explain it and he was even close to find a consistent rule able to 
rank any number of alternatives when cycles are present. However, attempts to 
fully understand this part of Condorcet’s voting theory have arrived at 
conclusions like “… the general rules for the case of any number of candidates as 
given by Condorcet are stated so briefly as to be hardly intelligible … and as no 
examples are given it is quite hopeless to find out what Condorcet meant” (E.J. 
Nanson as quoted in Black, 1958, p. 175). Or “The obscurity and self-
contradiction are without any parallel, so far as our experience of mathematical 
works extends … no amount of examples can convey an adequate impression of 
the evils” (Todhunter, 1949, p. 352 as cited by Young, 1988, p. 1234).
Attempts of clarifying, fully understanding and axiomatizing Condorcet’s 
approach for solving cycles have been mainly done by Kemeny (1959) who made 
the first intelligible description of the Condorcet approach, and by Young and 
Levenglick (1978) who made its clearest exposition and complete axiomatization.
In the version presented by Young and Levenglick (1978), the main 
methodological foundation is the maximum likelihood concept. In fact, 
“Condorcet’s argument proceeds along the following lines. People differ in their 
opinions because they are imperfect judges of which decision really is best. If on 
balance each voter is more often right than wrong, however, then the majority 
view is very likely to identify the decision that is objectively best.” (Young, 1988, 
p. 1232).
The maximum likelihood principle selects as a final ranking the one with the 
maximum pair-wise support. This selected ranking is the one which involves the 
minimum number of pair-wise inversions. Since Kemeny (1959) proposes the 
number of pair-wise inversions as a distance to be minimized between the 
selected ranking and the other individual profiles, the two approaches are 
perfectly equivalent. A formal proof of this equivalence can be found in Truchon 
(1988b, pp. 6-10). The selected ranking is also a median ranking for those 
composing the profile (in multi-criteria terminology it is the “compromise 
ranking” among the various conflicting points of view), for this reason the 
corresponding ranking procedure is often known as the Kemeny median order. 
Arrow and Raynaud (1986, p. 77) arrive at the conclusion that the highest 
feasible ambition for an aggregation algorithm building a multi-criterion ranking 
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is to be Condorcet. These authors discard the Kemeny median order, on the 
grounds that preference reversal phenomena may occur inside this approach 
(Arrow and Raynaud, 1986, p. 96). However, although the so-called Arrow-
Raynaud’s method does not present rank reversal, it is not applicable if cycles 
exist. Since in the context where composite indicators are built, cycles are very 
probable to occur, here the only solution is to follow Kemeny rule (or the 
equivalent maximum likelihood ranking procedure), thus accepting that rank 
reversals might appear6.
The acceptance of rank reversals phenomena implies that the famous axiom of 
independence of irrelevant alternatives of Arrow’s theorem is not respected. 
Anyway, Young (1988, p. 1241) claims that the maximum likelihood ranking 
procedure is the “only plausible ranking procedure that is locally stable”. Where 
local stability means that the ranking of alternatives does not change if only an 
interval of the full ranking is considered. 
The adaptation of the maximum likelihood ranking procedure to the ranking 
problem we are dealing with is reasonably simple (Munda, 2005). The maximum 
likelihood ranking of countries is the ranking supported by the maximum number 
of individual indicators for each pair-wise comparison, summed over all pairs of 
countries considered. More formally, all the N(N–1) pair-wise comparisons 
compose the outranking matrix E, where ejk + ekj = 1, with j k. Call R the set of 
all N! possible complete rankings of alternatives, R={rs}, s=1,2,..., N!. For each 
rs, compute the corresponding score  s as the summation of ejk over all the 





2
N
pairs j,k of alternatives, i.e. 
= e jks . (5) 
 
reandNskjwhere sjk= !...,2,1,
The final ranking ( r* ) is the one which maximises equation (6), which is: 
6
 Anyway a Condorcet consistent rule always presents smaller probabilities of the occurrence of a 
rank reversal in comparison with any Borda consistent rule. This is again a strong argument in 
favour of a Condorcet’s approach in our framework.
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Rewhereer jkjk = max**  . (6) 
 
Other properties of this ranking procedure are the following (Young and 
Levenglick, 1978).
• Neutrality: it does not depend on the name of any country, all countries
are equally treated.
• Unanimity (sometimes called Pareto Optimality): if all individual 
indicators prefer country a to country b than b should not be chosen.
• Monotonicity: if country a is chosen in any pair-wise comparison and only 
the individual indicator scores (i.e. the variables) of a are improved, then a
should be still the winning country. 
• Reinforcement: if the set A of countries is ranked by 2 subsets G1 and G2
of the individual indicator set G, such that the ranking is the same for both 
G1 and G2, then GGG = 21 should still supply the same ranking. This 
general consistency requirement is very important in the framework of 
composite indicators, since one may wish to apply the individual 
indicators belonging to each single dimension first and then pool them in 
the general model. It has to be noted that the maximum likelihood ranking 
procedure is the only Condorcet consistent rule which holds the 
reinforcement property and as noted by Arrow and Raynaud, 
reinforcement “… has definite ethical content and is therefore relevant to 
welfare economics and political science.” (Arrow and Raynaud, 1986, p. 
96). 
2.4 The computational problem
Moulin (1988, p. 312) clearly states that the Kemeny method (or equivalently 
the maximum likelihood approach) is “the correct method” for ranking 
alternatives, and that the “only drawback of this aggregation method is the 
difficulty in computing it when the number of candidates grows”. In fact the 
number of permutations can easily become unmanageable; for example when 10 
countries are present, it is 10!=3,628,800. Indeed this computational drawback is 
very serious since the Kemeny median order is NP-hard to compute.  This NP-
hardness has discouraged the development of algorithms searching for exact 
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solutions, thus the majority of the algorithms which have been proposed in the 
literature; are mainly heuristics based on artificial intelligence, branch and bound 
approaches and multi-stage techniques (see e.g., Barthelemy et al., 1989; Charon 
et al., 1997; Cohen et al., 1999; Davenport and Kalagnam, 2004; Dwork et al., 
2001; Truchon, 1998b). Recently, a new numerical algorithm aimed at solving the 
computational problem connected to linear median orders by looking for exact 
solutions has been developed too (Munda, 2006). 
Thanks to the existence of all these efficient computational algorithms, the 
maximum likelihood (or Kemeny) ranking procedure can always be applied in the 
context of composite indicators, where a high number of countries to be ranked is 
the normal state of affairs.
2.5 A sensitive issue: is information on intensity of preference complete lost 
in a Condorcet framework?
Given that the preference structure is based on equation (2), one might wonder 
if information on intensity of preference (when variables are measured on an 
interval or ratio scale) is completely lost in a Condorcet framework (since small 
and big intensities are treated equally). The problem is indeed very old. Its origins 
may be found in the famous bold paradox in Greek philosophy: how many hairs 
one has to cut off to transform a person with hairs to a bold one? Luce (1956) was 
the first one to discuss this issue formally in the framework of preference 
modelling. He introduced the idea of the existence of a sensibility threshold below 
which an agent either does not sense the difference between two elements, or 
refuses to declare a preference for one or the other. Mathematical 
characterisations of preference modelling with thresholds can be found in 
Roubens and Vincke (1985).
By introducing a positive indifference threshold q the resulting preference 
model is the so-called threshold model:









+>
qagagaIa
qagagaPa
kmjmkj
kmjmkj
)()(
)()(
(7) 
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where aj and ak belong to the set A of countries and gm to the set G of individual 
indicators. If one wishes to take into account the possible uncertainty around the 
value of the threshold q, sensitivity analysis and robustness analyses can be used 
(Saltelli et al., 2004), another possibility is the use of mathematical sophisticated 
concept such as the one of fuzzy preference modelling (Munda, 1995).
Finally, one should note that the intensity of preference can easily be used in 
the benchmarking step, where is not the ranking but the distance from a reference 
point what matters. For the majority of indicators used in assessment exercises no 
clear reference point is available, for instance, when GDP is used nobody knows 
the ideal value of a Country GDP, thus it is quite common to compare with other 
Countries GDP, e.g. the USA one. A first very simple benchmarking procedure 
can be the application of a normalisation rule known as “distance from the group 
leader”, which assigns 100 to the leading country in that particular individual 
indicator and other countries are ranked as percentage points away from the leader 
(OECD, 2003). More elegant approaches can be based on the so-called ideal point 
approaches, which is a well established technique in multi-criteria evaluation 
literature (see e.g. Yu, 1985; Zeleny, 1982). In this framework, to get a set of 
reference values, an “ideal point” can be defined by choosing the best values 
reached in any single indicator, and then mathematical distances are used. 
3.6 An Illustrative numerical example
Let’s take into consideration a simple hypothetical example where there are 
three countries (A, B, C) to be ranked according to a composite sustainability 
indicator. Let’s assume that three dimensions have to be considered, i.e. the 
economic, the social and the environmental ones, and that each dimension should 
have the same weight, that is 0.3333. 
The following individual indicators are used
Economic dimension
Indicator: GDP per capita. Weight: 0.165. Objective: maximisation of economic 
growth. Variable: US dollar per year.
Indicator: Unemployment rate. Weight: 0.165. Objective: minimisation of 
unemployed people. Variable: percentage of population.
Environmental dimension
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Indicator: Solid waste generated per capita. Weight: 0.333. Objective: 
minimisation of environmental impact. Variable: tons per year.
Social dimension
Indicator: Income disparity. Weight: 0.165. Objective: minimisation of 
distributional inequity. Variable: Q5/Q1.
Indicator: Crime rate. Weight: 0.165. Objective: minimisation of criminality. 
Variable: robberies per 1000 inhabitants.
The impact matrix described in Table 1 can then be constructed.
Indicators GDP Unemp. rate Solid waste Inc. dispar. Crime rate
Countries
A 22,000 0.17 0.4 10.5 40
B 45,000 0.09 0,45 11.0 45
C 20,000 0.08 0.35 5.3 80
Table 1. Impact matrix of the illustrative numerical example
Considering axioms 1, 2 and 3, and equation (3), the following pair-wise 
comparisons hold:
AB=0.333+0.165+0.165=0.6667
BA=0.165+0.165=0.333
AC=0.165+0.165=0.333
CA=0.165+0.333+0.165=0.666
BC=0.165+0.165=0.333
CB=0.165+0.333+0.165=0.666
These results can be synthesised in the outranking matrix:
0 0.666 0.333
0.333 0 0.333
0.666 0.666 0
A B C
A
E
B
C
 
 !
 !=
 !
 !
" #
7
 Comparing A with B it turns out that A stands out according to the indicators Solid wastes
(weight 0.333), Income disparity (weight 0.165) and Crime rate (weight (0.165).
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By applying the Kemeny rule to the 3! possible rankings it is:
ABC =1 0.666 + 0.333 + 0.333 = 1.333
BCA = 2 0.333 + 0.333 + 0.666 = 1.333
CAB =3 0.666 + 0.666 + 0.666 = 2
ACB = 4 0.333 + 0.666 + 0.666 = 1.666
BAC =5 0.333 + 0.333 + 0.333 = 1
CBA =6 0.666 + 0.666 + 0.333 = 1.666
The final ranking r* is then CAB.
Notice that using one of the standard ways to produce a composite indicator the 
result would be different. If for each country the composite indicator is calculated 
as difference from the group leader (which assigns 100 to the leading country and 
ranks the others as percentage points away from the leader), the impact matrix 
becomes:
Indicators GDP Unemp. rate Solid waste Inc. dispar. Crime rate
Countries
A 48.9 47.05 87.5 50.5 100
B 100 88.9 77.8 48.2 88.9
C 44.4 100 100 100 50
Table 2. Impact matrix: distance from the leader
The index will be calculated averaging each indicator (with the same weights as 
in the multi-criterion matrix) obtaining AI =69.8, BI = 79.7, and CI =81.9. The 
ranking would be CBA, different from what found with our non-linear/non-
compensatory proposal.
It is interesting to note that the only sources of uncertainty and imprecision 
assessment left in the mathematical modelling of the composite indicator 
proposed are:
1. The scale adjustment technique used (neither normalisation nor a common 
measurement unit are needed).
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2. The values of weights attached to dimensions and individual indicators.
As a consequence, these sources of uncertainty and imprecision assessment are 
reduced at the minimum possible level and a sensitivity analysis of the results is 
much easier to carry out than any other composite indicator. 
3. A Real-World Application: the Environmental Sustainability 
Index 
The "Environmental Sustainability Index" (ESI) for 2005 is produced by a 
team of environmental researchers from the Yale and Columbia Universities, in 
co-operation with the World Economic Forum and the EU's Joint Research 
Centre. The aim of the ESI is that of benchmarking the ability of 146 nations to 
protect the environment over the next decades, by integrating 76 data sets into 21 
individual indicators of environmental sustainability (see Esty at al., 2005). The 
data base used to construct the ESI covers a wide range of aspects of 
environmental sustainability ranging from variables measuring the physical state 
and stress of the environmental systems (like natural resource depletion, pollution, 
ecosystem destruction), to the more general social and institutional capacity to 
respond to environmental challenges. Poverty, short-term thinking and lack of 
investment in capacity and infrastructure committed to pollution control and 
ecosystem protection thus compete in determining the measure of a country’s 
sustainability.
Although the official ESI ranking is based upon the linear aggregation of 21 
equally weighted individual indicators, in the methodological appendix, an 
attempt has been made to apply the non-compensatory approach presented here, 
in order to tackle the issue of weights as “importance measure” and the 
compensability of different and crucial dimension of environmental sustainability
(see the Methodological Appendix in Esty et al., 2005).
Figure 1 compares the ranking obtained by means of the non-linear/non-
compensatory aggregation rule with the one of the ESI2005. In both cases all 21 
individual indicators are equally weighted. From this figure it is clear that the 
aggregation method used affects mainly the middle-of-the-road and, to a lesser 
extent, the leader and the laggard countries. Overall for the set of 146 countries, 
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the assumption on the aggregation scheme has an average impact of 8 ranks and a 
rank-order correlation coefficient of 0.962. In particular, while the top 50 
countries only move on average by 5 positions, the following 50 countries move 
on average by 12 positions and the latter 46 countries by 8 positions. 
y = 0.9623x + 2.7684
R2 = 0.9261
0
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Figure 1. Comparison of rankings obtained by the linear aggregation (named 
ESI2005 in the x-axis) and the non-linear/non-compensatory (named NCMA
in the y-axis) rules
It is important to underline that although both aggregation rules seem to produce 
consistent rankings (the R2 is 0.92), those rankings do not nevertheless coincide. 
Using the non-linear/non-compensatory approach, 43 out of 146 countries display 
a change in rank higher than 10 positions (none before the 30th ESI2005 rank). 
When compensability among indicators is not allowed, countries having very 
poor performance in some indicators, such as Indonesia or Armenia worsen their 
rank with respect to the linear yardstick, whereas countries that have less extreme 
values improve their situation, such as Azerbaijan or Spain. Table 3 shows the 
countries displaying the largest variation in their ranks.
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Aggregation ESI rank 
with LIN
rank with 
NCMC
Change 
in Rank
Azerbaijan 99 61 38
Spain 76 45 31
Nigeria 98 69 29
South 
Africa 93 68 25Im
pr
o
v
em
en
t
Burundi 130 107 23
Indonesia 75 114 39
Armenia 44 79 35
Ecuador 51 78 27
Turkey 91 115 24
D
et
er
io
ra
tio
n
Sri Lanka 79 101 22
Average change over 146 countries 8
Table 3. ESI rankings obtained by linear aggregation (LIN) and non-
linear/non-compensatory (NCMC) rules: countries that largely improve or 
worsen their rank position
4. Conclusion
This article starts from the assumption that, in some real-world applications, 
the linear aggregation rule is not the correct one for the building of relevant 
composite indicators. For this reasons a Condorcet consistent non-linear/non-
compensatory mathematical aggregation rule for the construction of composite 
indicators aimed at ranking countries has been developed here. This mathematical
aggregation rule can be divided into two main steps:
• pair-wise comparison of countries to be ranked,
• ranking of countries in a complete pre-order.
Weights are never combined with intensities of preference, as a consequence the 
theoretical guarantee they are importance coefficients is assured. Since intensities 
of preference are not used the degree of compensability connected with the 
aggregation model is at the minimum possible level. Given that the summation of 
weights is equal to one, the pair-wise comparisons can be synthesised in an 
outranking matrix, which can be interpreted as a voting matrix. 
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The information contained in the voting matrix is exploited to rank all 
alternatives in a complete pre-order by using a Condorcet consistent rule. A 
problem connected with the use of Condorcet consistent rules is the one of cycles. 
A cycle breaking rule normally needs some arbitrary choices such as to delete the 
cycle with the lowest support, and so on. A non-arbitrary cycle breaking rule is 
the so-called Kemeny median order which coincides with the maximum 
likelihood ranking proposed by Young and Levenglick.
Of course the approach we are proposing is not the “first best” possible 
approach for the construction of composite indicators.  It is a “second best” 
approach based on theoretical and empirical grounds, which makes assumptions 
explicit and thus easier to be evaluated in relation with a particular use. This 
increases both the coherence and the transparency of the ranking obtained. One 
has to remember, however, that Arrow’s theorem implies that some useful and 
desirable properties in an aggregation convention are always lost. Here the 
properties lost are anonymity (which does not constitute a problem since weights 
are explicitly allowed and decisiveness is gained) and independence of irrelevant 
alternatives (which on the contrary is a serious loss since rank reversals may 
appear). Furthermore, information on intensity of preference of variables is never 
used. This loss of information is a necessary price to pay for guaranteeing that 
compensability is reduced and that weights can be considered as symmetrical 
importance coefficients. However, information on the intensity of preference can 
be partly used if indifference thresholds are used. Moreover, ranking procedures 
can be complemented with benchmarking exercises which are fully based on the 
use of intensity of preference (of course when variables are measured on an 
interval or ratio scale).
Finally, one has to note that the overall quality of any composite indicator 
depends on the following elements:
1. information available (often data to measure variables are unreliable or simply 
missing; thus garbage in, garbage out phenomena may easily occur 
(Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1990));
2. individual indicators and variable chosen (i.e. which representation of reality 
is used). This, to a large extent, determines interpretability of an index.
3. direction of each indicator (i.e. the bigger the better or vice versa, sometimes 
this decision is not that easy);
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4. relative importance of these indicators (weights attached which are one of the 
main sources of technical uncertainty of the results provided; methodological 
discussion and sensitivity analysis are necessary to tackle this uncertainty by 
making it explicit);
5. mathematical aggregation convention used (the present paper has dealt with 
this step).
The quality of the aggregation convention is, yet, an important ingredient to 
guarantee the consistency between the assumptions used and the ranking 
obtained. Indeed, the overall quality of a composite indicator depends crucially on 
the way this mathematical model is embedded in the social, political and technical 
structuring process (Munda, 2004). This is especially true for the choice of 
weights that remains the most important source of uncertainty and debate. We 
have the firm conviction that weights are and must be context-dependent since
they reflect political, social and economic priorities and depend on the 
development path a country (or a group of countries) wants to pursue. Often we 
have seen policymakers using the umbrella of “science” to disguise lobbies, 
individual interests, or incompetence. Again, whatever aggregations procedure is 
used, we think that transparency must remain one of the main ingredients: without 
transparency the interpretability and coherence of indicators are difficult to 
achieve. 
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